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AbstrAct
On the basis of  notorious evidence of  corporate misconduct and of  the 
legal difficulty to ascertain private companies’ liability in international law, 
this article seeks to map such companies’ duties in international investment 
law. This is undertaken by perusing how this law field makes provision and 
room for the issue of  corporate social responsibility. As such, a trend exists 
in recent investment agreements and also in the arbitral jurisprudence which 
oversees investors’ malpractices so as to, firstly, foster a culture of  corporate 
social responsibility and to, secondly, evaluate their intrinsic legal protection. 
The present article maps this general direction of  duly considering inves-
tors’ duties while assessing their claims and discusses the legal purpose(s) of  
the new reference to corporate social responsibility in international invest-
ment law.
Keywords: investors’ duties, corporate social responsibility, clean hands.
resumo
Com base em notórios casos de irresponsabilidade social corporativa e 
considerando a dificuldade que se tem no Direito Internacional para respon-
sabilizar empresas privadas, esse artigo propõe um mapeamento dos deveres 
das empresas-investidoras no Direito Internacional dos Investimentos. Exa-
minar-se-á, para tanto, como esse ramo de Direito tem absorvido a questão 
da responsabilidade social corporativa. Há, dessa feita, uma tendência nos 
recentes acordos de investimentos e também na jurisprudência arbitral para 
não menosprezar o comportamento socialmente irresponsável dos inves-
tidores. O objetivo é, nesse sentido, duplo. Pela integração do comporta-
mento das empresas no debate, postula-se, por um lado, a criação de uma 
cultura de responsabilidade social das empresas e, por outro lado, avalia-se 
o teor real da proteção legal devida aos investidores. Logo, o presente artigo 
mapeará essa tendência de considerar os deveres dos investidores ao avaliar 
os seus pedidos na arbitragem internacional e discutirá, outrossim, a razão 
de ser jurídica dessa nova referência à responsabilidade social corporativa no 
Direito Internacional dos Investimentos.
Palavras-chave : deveres dos investidores, responsabilidade social corpora-
tiva, mãos limpas.
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1. IntroductIon
On the 25th June 2014, a group of  States — name-
ly Ecuador, South Africa, Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia 
—, championed the adoption of  a binding treaty on 
Business and Human Rights1. Shortly after this initiati-
ve, the proposal was formalized in a resolution entitled 
“Elaboration of  an international legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with 
respect to human rights”, adopted by the Human Rights 
Council2. The resolution kicked off  (anew) the debate 
on this problematic which has, in itself, a rather long 
history and whose attempts of  resolution have always 
been stillborn. 
The discussions about the binding agreement are 
ongoing through the work of  the Intergovernmental 
Working Group on Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Ri-
ghts established by the Human Rights Council3. They 
take stock of  the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights4 — the Ruggie principles — with an aim 
to take matters forward towards an instrument having 
a mandatory power on transnational companies. Still in 
2014, another group of  States5 proposed a draft resolu-
tion on the implementation of  the Guiding Principles 
to the Human Rights Council; one paragraph of  the 
draft’s preamble expresses the principal entanglement 
1 Human Rights Council, “Elaboration of  an international legally 
binding instrument on transnational corporations and other busi-
ness enterprises with respect to human rights”, Draft Resolution A/
HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 [25/06/2014].
2 Human Rights Council, “Elaboration of  an international legally 
binding instrument on transnational corporations and other busi-
ness enterprises with respect to human rights”, Resolution A/HRC/
RES/26/9 [14/07/2014].
3 Human Rights Council, “Report on the second session of  the 
open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights”, Resolution A/HRC/34/47 [04/01/2017] (Special rappor-
teur: María Fernanda Espinosa). See also: Olivier de Schutter, “To-
wards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights”, Business and 
Human Rights Journal, vol.1, no.1., 2015, pp. 41-67.
4 United Nations, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights. Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework”, New York and Geneva, United Nations 
[2011], 35p. The Guiding Principles were endorsed by the Hu-
man Rights Council on the 6th July 2011 in its resolution A/HRC/
RES/17/4 entitled “Human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises”.
5 These countries are: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bul-
garia, Colombia, France, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Ice-
land, India, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Russian Federation, Serbia, Macedonia, and Turkey.
lurking behind the current subject: 
“Concerned at legal and practical barriers to remedies for bu-
siness-related human rights abuses, which may leave those aggrie-
ved without opportunity for effective remedy, including through 
judicial and non-judicial avenues, and recognizing that it may be 
further considered whether relevant legal frameworks would pro-
vide more effective avenues of  remedy for affected individuals and 
communities […]”6.
The main concern is the simple finding that econo-
mic activities of  transnational companies may insidiou-
sly meander towards many non-economic components 
of  the host States’ society7 thereby causing considerable 
damage to the local population, environment, values or 
culture. The Chevron/Texaco investment in Ecuador 
— with its socio-environmental upheavals — in itself  
tellingly expresses the thorny issue of  a long term cor-
porate malpractice in so-called developing countries8. 
Chevron/Texaco’s investment in the oil exploration 
sector had deleterious consequences on the environ-
ment through deforestation, river and soil pollution, 
and toxic waste spills in the Ecuadorian Amazon fo-
rest. This consequently affected human health and the 
local population has been diagnosed with illnesses like 
cancers, respiratory problems and other serious health 
complications. For these same reasons, the companies’ 
activities encroached on the population’s food security 
and access to drinking water. Last but not least, indige-
nous communities were forcefully displaced from their 
lands for the investment’s well-being9. 
6 Human Rights Council, “Human rights and transnational cor-
porations and other business enterprises”, Draft resolution A/
HRC/26/L.1 [23/06/2014].
7 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Aux quatre vents du monde. Petit guide de 
navigation sur l’océan de la mondialisation, Paris, Seuil, 2016, p.62; Muth-
ucumaraswamy Sornarajah, “Mutations of  Neo-Liberalism in Inter-
national Investment Law », Trade Law and Development, vol.3, 2011, 
pp. 203-232.
8 See generally: Judith Kimerling, “Oil, Contact, and Conservation 
in the Amazon: Indigenous Huaorani, Chevron, and Yasuni”, Colo-
rado Journal of  International Environmental Law and Policy, vol.24, no.1, 
2013, pp. 43-115; Eric David, Gabrielle Lefèvre, Juger les multination-
ales. Droits humains bafoués, ressources pillées, impunité organisée, Bruxelles, 
Louvain, 2015, pp.28-30; Kate Miles, The Origins of  International In-
vestment Law. Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of  Capital, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 140-146.
9 Sucumbios Provincial Court of  Justice [Sole Chamber], Law-
suit No. 2003-0002 [Reporting Judge: Nícolas Zambrano Lozada]. 
See also: Eric David, Gabrielle Lefèvre, Juger les multinationales. Droits 
humains bafoués, ressources pillées, impunité organisée, Bruxelles, Louvain, 
2015, pp.28-29; Kate Miles, The Origins of  International Investment Law. 
Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of  Capital, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013, pp. 141-143; Maxi Lyons, “A Case 
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There is, likewise, notorious evidence bearing tes-
timony of  corporate misconduct. This said, the pre-
sent article does not have as main purpose reviewing 
all the relevant cases. The Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre monitors the corporate social respon-
sibility of  companies throughout the world and offers 
an extensive list of  cases on its website to which the 
reader can have easy access10. There is also considerable 
evidence of  such adverse corporate impact in the le-
gal literature11. The matter develops into a conundrum 
because of  the frequent difficulty faced to determine 
the companies’ liability or to obtain effective reparation 
in such cases. This can be related to complex corpo-
rate structure12 which sometimes makes it difficult for 
victims to climb up to the parent company to seek for 
reparation. The theory of  separate corporate legal per-
sonality13 is here normally invoked by companies. This 
Study in Multinational Corporate Accountability: Ecuador’s Indig-
enous Peoples Struggle for Redress”, Denver Journal of  Interna-
tional Law and Policy, vol.32, 2004, pp. 701-732.
10 The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre profiles an 
extensive list of  cases on its website: https://business-humanrights.
org/en/corporate-legal-accountability/case-profiles/complete-list-
of-cases-profiled
11 See for example: Jennifer Zerk, “Corporate Liability for Gross 
Human Rights Abuses. Towards a Fairer and More Effective System 
of  Domestic Law Remedies”, Report prepared for the Office of  the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014, 123p; Eric David, Gabrielle 
Lefèvre, Juger les multinationales. Droits humains bafoués, ressources pillées, 
impunité organisée, Bruxelles, Louvain, 2015, 190p; Kate Miles, The 
Origins of  International Investment Law. Empire, Environment and the Safe-
guarding of  Capital, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 
pp. 125-224; Delphine Couveinhes-Matsumoto, Les droits des peoples 
autochtones et l’exploitation des ressoucres naturelles en Amérique latine, Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 2016, pp. 49-61; Michael Wright, “Corporations and 
Human Rights. A Survey of  the Scope and Patterns of  Alleged Cor-
porate Human Rights Abuse”, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, 
working paper nº.44, Cambridge MA: John F. Kennedy School of  
Government, Harvard University, 2008, pp. 1-30; Lilian Aponte Mi-
randa, “The Hybrid State-Corporate Enterprise and Violations of  
Indigenous Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility and 
Accountability under International Law”, Lewis & Clark Law Review, 
vol.135, 2007, pp. 135-183; Maxi Lyons, “A Case Study in Multi-
national Corporate Accountability: Ecuador’s Indigenous Peoples 
Struggle for Redress”, Denver Journal of  International Law and 
Policy, vol.32, 2004, pp. 701-732; Maria Júlia Gomes de Andrade 
et al., Inside the Vale of  Mud: A Report on the Tailings Dam Collapse in 
Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, Justiça Global, 2016, 42p.; Manoela Carneiro 
Roland et al., Violation of  Human Rights by Companies. The Case of  the 
Açu Port, Juiz de Fora, HOMA-Human Rights and Business Centre, 
2016, 22p.
12 Anna Beckers, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsiility Codes. On 
Global Self-Regulation and National Private Law, Oxford, Hart Publish-
ing, 2015, p.11. 
13 Stephen Tully, International Corporate Responsibility, Alphen Aan 
Den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2012, p.8
was, for instance, what happened in the Bhopal case 
in which the Union Carbide Company — incorpora-
ted in the United States of  America — successfully ar-
gued that its Indian subsidiary, Union Carbide of  India, 
was a separate legal entity for whose actions the parent 
company could not be held liable14. The Bhopal disaster 
was due to a toxic gas leak from a pesticide manufactu-
ring factory owned by Union Carbide and operated by 
Union Carbide of  India. The victims of  the Chevron/
Texaco activities in Ecuador had to face this same diffi-
culty of  piercing the corporate veil in trying to enforce 
a decision of  the Ecuadorian Supreme Court in Canada 
— a decision which condemned the company to a pay-
ment of  damages of  9,51 billion dollars. The plaintiffs 
argued, amongst others, that the Chevron Corporation 
fully controlled its Canadian subsidiary, Chevron Cana-
da Ltd. and that the global corporate structure had the 
same Board of  Directors; the parent company could 
thus be “reached” through the subsidiary. Upholding 
the doctrine of  corporate separateness, the Superior 
Court of  Justice of  Ontario declared that the Chevron 
Corporation and Chevron Canada Ltd. were, in law, two 
separate entities and that the latter could not be held 
liable for damages caused by the former15. 
A similar debate arises when parent companies con-
sider that they do not bear responsibility for damages 
caused by service providers or by outsourced companies, 
contending that the latter’s activities escapes from the 
main entity’s sphere of  influence16. This happened, for 
example, after the collapse of  the Rana Plaza in Dacca, 
Bangladesh. The Rana Plaza was home to garment fac-
tories manufacturing clothes for renowned brands and 
the building, left to crumble, did not minimally respect 
construction security requirements17; it was, moreover, 
revealed that some of  the factories were oblivious in 
terms of  basic labour laws18. Concerned companies, like 
14 Union of  India v. Union Carbide, United States Court of  Appeal, 
Second Circuit, 809 F.2d 195 [14/01/1987]; Jagarnath Sahu, et al., v. 
Union Carbide Corporation and Madhya Pradesh State, United States Dis-
trict Court – Southern District of  New York, Case no. 07 Civ. 2156 
[30/07/2014].
15 See: Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 2017 ONSC 135 (CanLII) 
[20/01/2017], paras.57-60 (available at: http://canlii.ca/t/gx2x6).
16 Generally, on the sphere of  influence, see: Gilles Lhuilier, Le 
droit transnational, Paris, Dalloz, 2016, p. 231. 
17 Eric David, Gabrielle Lefèvre, Juger les multinationales. Droits 
humains bafoués, ressources pillées, impunité organisée, Bruxelles, Louvain, 
2015, pp. 42-43.
18 Sherpa, “Affaire Auchan/Rana Plaza : de nouvelles preuves de 
violations des droits des travailleurs dans les usines sous-traitantes 
du distributeur”, Press Release (20/10/2015) [available at : https://
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Auchan, retorted that their duty of  diligence did not 
extend that far in the supply chain19. And it is namely 
after this case that France adopted its famous statute on 
the duty of  diligence of  parent companies20.
The afore-described panorama dialectically bucks 
into the field of  international investment law. Indeed, 
these same companies whose transnational activities 
allegedly or demonstrably have adverse socio-environ-
mental impacts are potentially protected by a wide array 
of  investment protection agreements. Said otherwise, 
in international law, the investor-company and its in-
vestment benefit from a consolidated legal bulwark 
to protect its activities but have, in international law, 
very few obligations vis-à-vis the host States and their 
population21: there is a power relationship in disequili-
brium with a hyper-protected corporate world on one 
side, and sometimes vulnerable communities on the 
other22; moreover, the domestic legal systems are not 
always effective when it comes to dealing with private 
companies liability; besides the same State may some-
times have conflicting commitments in international 
law whereby the legal protection of  foreign investors 
www.asso-sherpa.org/affaire-auchan-rana-plaza-de-nouvelles-
preuves-de-violations-des-droits-des-travailleurs-dans-les-usines-
sous-traitantes-du-distributeur].
19 Nicolas Cuzacq, “Panorama en droit économique”, in, Kathia 
Martin-Chenut, René de Quenaudon, La RSE saisie par le droit. Per-
spective interne et internationale, Paris, Pédone, 2016, pp. 107-108.
20 Statute n° 2017-399 on the Duty of  Diligence of  parent com-
panies (in French, loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et 
des entreprises donneuses d’ordre) [27/03/2017] (available at: https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/3/27/2017-399/jo/texte). 
See also : Marie-Ange Moreau, “Le devoir de vigilance”, Droit social, 
no.10, October 2017, p. 792 et seq.
21 Patrick Juillard, “Le système actuel est-il déséquilibré en faveur 
de l’investisseur privé étranger et au détriment de l’État d’accueil ? ”, 
in, Charles Leben (org.), Le contentieux arbitral transnational relatif  à 
l’investissement. Nouveaux Développements, Paris, L.G.D.J., 2006, pp. 
190-191; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, « Power and Justice: 
Third World Resistence in International Law », Singapore Yearbook 
of  International Law, vol.10, 2006, p. 32; Patrick Dumbery, Gabri-
elle Dumas-Aubin, “How to Impose Human Rights Obligations on 
Corporations Under Investment Treaties?”, Yearbook of  International 
Investment Law and Policy, vol.4, 2012, p. 569; Kartsen Nowrot, “How 
to Include Environmental Protection, Human Rights and Sustain-
ability in International Investment Law?”, Journal of  World Investment 
and Trade, vo.15, 2014, p. 619. for a more nuanced point of  view, see: 
Jorge Viñuales, “Invest Diligence in Investment Arbitration: Sources 
and Arguments”, ICSID Review, vol.32, nº.2, 2017, p. 367.
22 See: Working Group on the issue of  human rights and transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises (Human Rights 
Council), Report on Promotion and protection of  human rights: human rights 
questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoy-
ment of  human rights and fundamental freedoms, Document A/72/162 
[18/07/2017], p. 9.
must be articulated with environmental, human rights 
or health protection23. Traditionally, investment agree-
ments24 have been solely moulded to protect transna-
tional investments of  private companies. Very often, 
investment agreements models were drafted by indus-
trialised States and later on signed with developing ones 
with minimum or no negotiations25. The latter group of  
countries accepted the ‘proposed’ agreements under the 
belief  that these would foster more investments in their 
territory, thereby enabling them to achieve their quest 
of  development26. Foreign investment promotion was 
construed through the optic of  investment protection 
and the investment agreements models reflected the 
perspective and interests of  capital exporting countries 
in the context of  a winning free market economy in 
which the market often makes the law27. The watchword 
was therefore a minimum restriction to the free circula-
tion of  capital and investments. And any kind of  obli-
gation, duty or performance imposed upon investors 
could eventually contradict the economic logic of  free 
circulation, the political will of  importing and exporting 
investments, and the legal protection offered by invest-
ment agreements. 
Authors like Theodore Lewitt or Milton Friedman 
vehemently criticised the doctrine of  corporate social 
responsibility, defending that it constituted an undesi-
rable intrusion in business whose main purpose is to 
maximise profits and not to substitute the State in social 
matters and public policy28. Interestingly, however, in 
23 See, for instance, the debate in the Philip Morris case: Philip 
Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. 
v. Oriental Republic of  Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award 
(09/07/2016).
24 Most of  the international investment agreements are available 
at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA
25 Patrick Juillard, “Le système actuel est-il déséquilibré en faveur 
de l’investisseur privé étranger et au détriment de l’État d’accueil ? ”, 
in, Charles Leben (org.), Le contentieux arbitral transnational relatif  à 
l’investissement. Nouveaux Développements, Paris, L.G.D.J., 2006, pp. 190-
191; Nitish Monebhurrun, La fonction du développement dans le droit in-
ternational des investissements, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2016, pp. 72-73.
26 For a critical view on this question, see : Nitish Monebhurrun, 
La fonction du développement dans le droit international des investissements, 
Paris, L’Harmattan, 2016, pp. 68-69.
27 William Bourdon, Yann Queinec, Réguler les entreprises transna-
tionales. 46 propositions, Paris, Sherpa, Décembre 2010, p. 13 [available 
at : https://www.asso-sherpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/
CDP-francais.pdf]
28 See : Theodore Lewitt, “The Dangers of  Social Responsibil-
ity”, Harvard Business Review, September-October 1958, pp. 41-50; 
Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of  Business is to In-
crease Its Profits”, The New York Times Magazine, 16 septembre 1970 
[available at:  http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/dunnweb/rprn-
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the fifties, the concept of  corporate social responsibility 
was used, namely in the United States of  America, as an 
instrument of  propaganda of  positive capitalism… a 
doctrine of  friendly and caring business — against the 
communist ideology29. From the sixties to the eighties, 
the very concept of  corporate social responsibility, that 
of  investors’ duties, were very incipient, at least in in-
ternational law. In international politics, concern was 
raised about the companies’ social responsibility after a 
famous speech delivered by Chilean President Salvador 
Allende on the 4th December 1972 before the United 
Nations’ General Assembly on the devastating conse-
quences of  transnational companies’ activities 30.  But 
still today, on concrete terms, corporate social responsi-
bility often amounts to a procrastinating debate31.
Investors’ duties, under the logic of  corporate so-
cial responsibility, mean the measures imposed on or 
recommended to companies so as to mitigate the nega-
tive human, environmental and social impacts of  their 
activities32; the idea is to transcend the inner corporate 
structure and the sole shareholder’s interests, thereby 
setting up a business intelligence which is able to envi-
sage and eventually prevent a company’s adverse social 
impacts33. The duty consists of  adopting a corporate 
behaviour to mitigate these impacts so as to attain a le-
vel of  social responsibility which, when necessary, goes 
beyond that required by the host State and which must 
ts.friedman.dunn.pdf].
29 Jean-Pascal Gond, Jacques Igalens, La responsabilité sociale de 
l’entreprise, Paris, PUF, 2008, p. 16.
30 Salvador Allende, “Speech before the United Nations’ General 
Assembly”, 4th December 1972 (excerpts available at: http://www.
rrojasdatabank.info/foh12.htm).
31 Harwell Wells, « The Cycles of  Corporate Social Responsibility: 
An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century”, Kansas 
Law Riew, vol.51, 2002, p. 78.
32 United Nations Environmental Program, Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility and Regional Trade and Investment Agreements, UNEP, 2011, 
p. 13; Amiram Gill, “Corporate Governance as Social Responsibil-
ity: A Research Agenda”, Berkley Journal of  International Law, vol.26, 
no.2, 2008, pp. 453-454; Steven R. Ratner, “Corporations and Hu-
man Rights: A Theory of  Legal Responsibility”, Yale Law Journal, 
vol.111., 2001, pp. 443-545; Erik Assadourian, “Transforming 
Corporations”, in, Linda Starke (org.), The State of  the World 2006. 
A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 
London, WW. Norton and Company, 2006, p. 172; Kate Miles, The 
Origins of  International Investment Law. Empire, Environment and the Safe-
guarding of  Capital, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 
218; Stephen Tully, International Corporate Responsibility, Alphen Aan 
Den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2012, pp. 20-22.
33 Harwell Wells, « The Cycles of  Corporate Social Responsibility: 
An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century”, Kansas 
Law Riew, vol.51, 2002, p. 78.
equally apply to all the companies of  the same group 
independently of  their business location34. These duties 
can be voluntarily set by the companies themselves in 
the sense of  a self-regulation; and, as mentioned, there 
is also considerable effort being deployed for these to 
be provided for in binding legal instruments.
The United Nations tentatively worked on a draft 
code of  conduct for transnational corporation through 
its Centre on Transnational Corporations in the seven-
ties35. Such efforts have, for the moment, been vain within 
the ambit of  the United Nations Organisation. Despite 
the adoption of  the ten principles of  a Global Compact 
in 200036, these remain very general in their formulation 
and are, furthermore, voluntary when it comes to their 
effective implementation by companies. The same com-
ment applies to the Organisation for Economic Coope-
ration and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises37 or the so-called Ruggie Principles38. These 
initiatives surely constitute small hesitant steps towards 
the long run construction of  a consolidated corporate 
social responsibility legal regime. But the long run always 
appears as an eternity when the subject is private com-
panies’ responsibility in international law. The normati-
vity in this field seems to become liquid, with dominant 
actors — transnational corporations — capitalizing on a 
system of  self-regulation39 in a sort of  untouchable ivory 
tower, while being sometimes theatrically judged by Opi-
nion Tribunals40 with no real legal effects.
34 Hervé Ascensio, “Le pacte mondial et l’apparition d’une re-
sponsabilité internationale des entreprises”, in, Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes, Emmanuelle Mazuyer, Le Pacte mondial – 10 ans après. 
The Global Compact – 10 Years After, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011, p. 169.
35 A 1983 version of  the Code of  conduct is available at: http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2891. For 
more information, see: Karl P. Sauvant, “The Negotiations of  the 
United Nations Code of  Conduct on Transnational Corporations 
Experience and Lessons Learned”, Journal of  World Investment and 
Trade, vol.16, 2015, pp. 11-87.
36 Global Compact, adopted on the 26th July 2000 (available at: 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles).
37 The guidelines are available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
mne/48004323.pdf. See also: Jorge Viñuales, “Invest Diligence in 
Investment Arbitration: Sources and Arguments”, ICSID Review, 
vol.32, no.2 2017, p. 349.
38 United Nations, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights. Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework”, New York and Geneva, United Nations 
[2011], 35p.
39 In a similar sense: Zygmunt Bauman, La cultura en el mundo de la 
modernidad líquida, Mexico, FCE, 2013, p. 52.
40 See: International Monsanto Tribunal, Advisory Opinion 
(18/04/2017) [available at: http://en.monsantotribunal.org/up-
load/asset_cache/189791450.pdf].
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This article will not indulge in a normative posture 
to postulate how the law should be on these questions. 
Having international investment law as a study ba-
ckground, it will instead examine if  the generous pro-
tection granted to investors can be articulated with their 
duties. To this interrogation, the working and analysis 
method consist of  scrutinising how and to what extent 
investment agreements and the arbitral jurisprudence 
provide for investors’ duties. The objective of  this arti-
cle is therefore to critically map and categorise such du-
ties as they appear in international investment law. Ac-
cordingly, the study shows that some recent investment 
agreements indeed provide for investors’ social respon-
sibility; as such, the latter potentially becomes a new 
yardstick against which to measure the legal protection 
due to companies (Chapter 1). Similarly, an analysis of  
the arbitral jurisprudence reveals a set of  techniques to 
map the investors’ corporate social behaviour which 
consequently act as a benchmark when it comes to eva-
luate the extent of  their legal protection (Chapter 2).
2. provIdIng for Investor’s dutIes In 
Investment Agreements As A new YArdstIck 
for theIr protectIon
A small constellation of  companies’ duties has star-
ted to appear in investment agreements and even if  they 
are normally presented as recommendations (2.1.), they 
can be construed as a parameter for investors’ legal pro-
tection (2.2.).
2.1. Investors’ Duties Entrenched in Investment 
Agreements as Recommendations
These recommendations are coined in a twofold 
manner. Firstly, they are formulated as per a top-down 
logic: this means that they are primarily addressed to 
signatory States which must encourage companies in-
vesting on their territory to adopt corporate social res-
ponsibility standards (2.1.1.). Secondly, the recommen-
dations follow a — more recent — bottom-up pathway 
being addressed directly to the investors (2.1.2.).
2.1.1. Recommending duties to investors throu-
gh States under a top-down logic
Some treaties address the issue of  investors’ corpo-
rate behaviour in the host States but leave to the latter 
the duty of  adopting all necessary measures for such 
purposes. It is well-known that the great majority of  in-
vestment agreements state that investments must be un-
dertaken in conformity with the Host State’s local law: 
in a nutshell, an illegally constituted investment cannot 
be protected by an investment agreements. This, as per 
some tribunals, can be considered as a non-written rule 
of  international investment law41. This rule however 
generally refers to the company’s establishment in the 
Host State.
On other grounds, provisions have started to appear 
in investment agreements that make room for corpo-
rate social responsibility during the investment’s imple-
mentation. Their formulation varies according to the 
agreements with a language which can be mandatory or 
unbinding. For instance, the bilateral investment agree-
ment signed between Canada and Mongolia on the 8th 
September 2016 states: 
“Each Party should encourage enterprises operating within 
its territory or subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate 
internationally recognized standards of  corporate social responsi-
bility in their practices and internal policies, such as statements of  
principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the Parties. 
These principles address issues such as labour, the environment, 
human rights, community relations and anti-corruption. The 
Parties should remind those enterprises of  the importance of  in-
corporating such corporate social responsibility standards in their 
internal policies.”42
A similar provision exists in the recent investment 
or free-trade agreements signed by States like Canada, 
41 SAUR International S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID n°04/4, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Liability (6/06/2012), para. 308; Gustav F W 
Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Ghana, ICSID n° ARB/07/24, Award 
(18/06/2010), paras.123-124; Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Petroleum Products 
Société S.A. v. Albania, ICSID n° ARB/11/24, Award (30/03/2015), 
para. 359.
42 Agreement Between Canada and Mongolia for the Promotion 
and Protection of  Investments (08/09/2016), art.14.
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Colombia, the Netherlands43, Chile44, Singapore45 or by 
the European Union46, some of  which are still awaiting 
ratification. The signatory States are expected to foster 
a corporate social responsibility practice on their terri-
tory and can, as per these agreements, only encourage 
foreign investors to fine-tune their activities in order to 
mitigate impacts on the environment, on human rights, 
on local communities and to abstain from practices of  
corruption. The internationally recognised standards 
are, for example, the OECD guidelines, the Internatio-
nal Labour Organization Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work47, the Global Compact 
and more recently, the Ruggie principles. As such, the 
corporate social responsibility initiative emanates from 
the State and, if  successful, drips down to the compa-
nies. But even so, such practices by companies remain 
largely voluntary at this level. Investors, via their Host 
States, are invited to adopt a corporate social behaviour 
and can, needless to say, decline the invitation. Similarly, 
States might fear losing their appeal vis-à-vis foreign in-
vestors if  they fanatically indulge in imposing duties to 
43 See for example for Canada: Bilateral Investment Agree-
ment signed with: Guinea (27/05/2015), art.16; Burkina Faso 
(20/04/2015) art.16; Cameroon (03/03/2014) art.15; Ivory Coast 
(30/11/2014) art.15; Mali (28/11/2014) art.15; Nigeria (06/05/2014) 
art.16; Senegal (27/11/2014) art.16; Serbia (01/09/2014) art.16; Be-
nin (09/01/2013) arts. 4, 16. Free-Trade Agreements signed with: 
The European Union (30/10/2016), arts. 24.12[1](c), 25.4 [2](c); 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (04/02/2016), art.9.17; South Korea 
(22/05/2014) art.8.16; Honduras (05/11/2013) art.10.16; Pana-
ma (14/05/2010) art.9.17; Colombia (21/11/2008) art.816; Peru 
(29/05/2008) art. 810.
For Colombia, see: bilateral investment agreement signed with 
France (10/07/2014), art.11; with Brazil (09/10/2015), art.13; and 
free-trade agreements signed with Panama (20/09/2013), art.14; 
Costa Rica (22/05/2013) art.12.9; Canada (21/11/2008), art.816; 
with the European Union and Peru (26/06/2012), art.271/3.
For the Netherlands, see: bilateral investment agreement signed with 
the United Arab Emirates (26/11/2013), art.2 (3).
44 Investment Agreement between the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region of  the People’s Republic of  China and Chile 
(18/11/2016), art.16; Free-Trade Agreement between Chile and 
Uruguay (04/10/2016), art.11.8, art.12.6.
45 Investment Agreement between Singapore and Nigeria 
(04/11/2016), art.11.
46 Free-Trade Agreement with the SADC (10/06/2016), art. 11 
(3) [c] or with Canada (30/10/2016), art. 24.12[1](c), 25.4 [2](c); with 
Kazakhstan (21/12/2015), art. 148 (3); with Georgia (27/06/2014), 
art. 231 (e), art. 348, art. 349, art. 352; with Moldavia (27/06/2014), 
art. 35, art 367 (e); with South Korea (06/10/2010), art. 13 [6] (2); 
with Ukraine (27/06/2014), art. 422.
47 International Labour Organization Declaration on Fundamen-
tal Principles and Rights at Work [18/06/1998] [available at: http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/
documents/publication/wcms_467653.pdf]
these companies. Resultantly, there might be more so-
mething of  an appearance of  corporate social respon-
sibility than an intrinsic concern which would normally 
be displayed by binding rules or by an enforcement sys-
tem. Consequently, their intrinsic value and utility can, 
to some extent, be questioned. This scepticism is exa-
cerbated most of  all when some investment agreements 
specifically highlight that issues related to the corporate 
social responsibility clause cannot be a contentious sub-
ject submitted to an arbitral tribunal48. This, of  course, 
raises the question of  their very ratio legis.
Some countries like Canada and Colombia coined a 
reporting mechanism in the sense of  a Human Rights 
impact assessment. The idea, intellectually and metho-
dologically interesting, is to measure the impact of  bu-
siness activities on Human Rights; such reporting could 
technically act as a barometer of  corporate social beha-
viour and enable to identify eventual flaws in business 
practices. The two States thereby adopted an Agreement 
Concerning Annual Reports on Human Rights and Free Trade 
Between Canada and the Republic of  Colombia with the ob-
jective of  assessing the effects “of  the measures taken under 
the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of  
Colombia on human rights in the territories of  both Canada and 
the Republic of  Colombia”49. Until now, Canada submit-
ted six reports to the House of  Commons and to the 
Senate (from 2012 and 2016)50. These however remain 
globally vague and do not reveal a consolidated regime 
of  corporate social responsibility within the ambit of  
business and human rights51.
If  from a cynical perspective the debate hence see-
ms to boil down to an eternal recurrence, another com-
48 Agreement Between Canada and Mongolia for the Promotion 
and Protection of  Investments (08/09/2016), art.20 (1); Agree-
ment Between Canada and Guinea for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of  Investments Guinea (27/05/2015), art.21 (1); Brazil-Chile 
ACFI (24/11/2015), annex 1, art.1 (2); Brazil-Colombia ACFI 
(09/10/2015), art. 23 (3);  Investment agreement between the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of  the People’s Republic of  
China and Chile (18/11/2016), art. 21[1] (a) (i).
49 Agreement Concerning Annual Reports on Human Rights and Free 
Trade Between Canada and the Republic of  Colombia (27/05/2010), [avail-
able at: http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105278], 
art. 1(1).
50 These reports are available at: http://www.canadainternation-
al.gc.ca/colombia-colombie/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/hrft-
co_2012-dple.aspx?lang=eng
51 James Rochlin, “A golden opportunity lost: Canada’s Human 
Rights Impact Assessment and the Free Trade Agreement with 
Colombia”, The International Journal of  Human Rights, vol.18, no.4/5, 
2014, pp. 545-566.
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prehension of  the matter still remains possible. There is 
no doubt that corporate social responsibility in the abo-
vementioned agreements enters the realm of  soft law. 
Such soft formulation can however be the initial steps 
for the creation of  corporate social responsibility and 
of  investors’ duties culture in international investment 
law. For many decades, investment law had the only vo-
cation of  protecting foreign investors — and, of  cour-
se, this is not likely to change drastically. Yet, if  this law 
field is to incorporate other priorities or other values, 
this process forcefully requires a period of  adaptation 
to enable the cultural incorporation of  corporate social 
responsibility. In other words, it is unlikely and highly 
unrealistic that a drastic conversion — of  States and of  
companies — to corporate social responsibility would 
occur overnight under the aspect of  a binding legal rule. 
There are many political, economic and social forces to 
be dealt with and conciliated in this debate. Any radical 
or pugnacious position would certainly be counterpro-
ductive. The soft law regime approach is certainly not 
the most immediately efficient but it can be argued that 
it constitutes a first stepping stone towards the cons-
truction and diffusion of  corporate social responsibility 
practices under a policy of  small steps. And in this sen-
se, a new step has effectively been hurdled considering 
that provisions directly addressed to investors on their 
corporate duties characterise a small bundle of  new in-
vestment agreements.
2.1.2. Recommending duties directly to inves-
tors under a bottom-up logic to foster the crea-
tion of a corporate social responsibility culture
Every internationalist jurist is acquainted to the 
classicism according to which legal persons, like pri-
vate companies, are deprived of  a legal personality in 
international law. This said, it cannot be ignored that 
many private companies are economically more power-
ful than a good number of  States52, without mentioning 
that their economic activities can sometimes be detri-
mental to the local population, as explained in the in-
troduction of  this article. It would therefore be a lure 
to (still) consider that private companies having trans-
52 Brian Roach, “Corporate Power in a Global World”, Global De-
velopment and Environment Institute Working Paper, 2007, p. 5 [available 
at: http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/education_materials/modules/
Corporate_Power_in_a_Global_Economy.pdf]; Noreena Hertz, 
The Silent Takeover. Global Capitalism and the Death of  Democracy, Lon-
don, Arrow, 2002, p. 43.
national economic activities bear absolutely no interna-
tional responsibility if  they happen to cause a social, 
human or environmental damage. The status quo will 
prevail only if  the legal doctrine maintains a compla-
cent or an orthodox position. The legal conscience on 
this issue is undeniable. It is worth recalling that the 
present debate has been amplified, going beyond pri-
vate companies, to include the social responsibility of  
non-governmental organisations. The National Contact 
Point of  the OECD in Switzerland has, for instance, ac-
cepted a claim against the World Wild Fund for Nature 
International (WWF) for human rights — indigenous 
rights — violation in Cameroon. The claim was lodged 
by another NGO, Survival International, against WWF 
for violation of  the OECD Guidelines for Multinatio-
nal Enterprises; the WWF is allegedly suspected to have 
violated the land rights of  the Baka ‘Pygmy’ People53 
and its size and influence rendered it tantamount to a 
multinational company.
In this context of  great concern about the social im-
pacts of  transnational corporations, it is therefore not 
surprising to see the premises of  investors’ duties, via the 
institution of  corporate social responsibility addressed 
directly to companies, in some investment agreements. 
And it can be claimed that this trend will be followed 
in future investment agreements. The Brazilian Agree-
ments on Cooperation and on the Facilitation on In-
vestments (ACFI)54 are here topical. They contain very 
detailed recommendations in a specific chapter or in an 
annex entitled “Corporate Social Responsibility. The 
provisions relate to the following: environment protec-
tion and clean technology; respect of  human rights; local 
development and cooperation with local communities; 
formation of  human capital; respect of  local law and 
regulations in the field of  health, security, environment 
53 Details about the pending case are available at: https://www.
oecdwatch.org/cases-fr/Case_457.
Survival International submission file is available at: http://assets.
survivalinternational.org/documents/1527/survival-internation-v-
wwf-oecd-specific-instance.pdf
54 Generally, on the ACFIs see: Nitish Monebhurrun, “Novelty in 
International Investment Law: The Brazilian Agreement on Coop-
eration and Facilitation of  Investments as a Different International 
Investment Agreement Model”, Journal of  International Dispute Settle-
ment, vol.8, 2017, pp. 77-100; Fabio Morosini and Michelle Ratton 
Sanchez Badin, ‘The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Fa-
cilitation of  Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International 
Investment Agreements?’ Investment Treaty News (4 August 2015) 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-
on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formu-
la-for-international investment-agreements/.
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and labour laws; practices of  self-regulation to make 
the companies’ activities socially acceptable; training of  
employees to incorporate the culture and the practices 
of  corporate social responsibility; non-discrimination 
of  employees having reported the companies’ socially 
irresponsible and illegal practices to the local authori-
ties; the implementation of  corporate social responsibi-
lity practices within the companies’ sphere of  influence; 
the respect of  local political affairs55. There is a manifest 
will to extract companies from a close, clinically isolated 
circuit in order to make their investing activities socially 
acceptable56 while tentatively building bridges between 
foreign investment and local population. 
Such provisions do not characterise only the new 
Brazilian agreements. The Intra-Mercosur Investment 
Facilitation Protocol contains an article 13 entitled 
“Obligations of  Investors” which States that compa-
nies must — the language is here mandatory — abide 
to local laws and regulations related to investment and 
taxation; it also states that investors must not indulge in 
acts of  corruption during their activities57. Article 14 of  
the same protocol provides for corporate social respon-
sibility in a way remindful of  the Brazilian investment 
agreements, that is, with a list of  recommendations 
which the investors can incorporate in their activities. 
The general logic and ratio legis of  these recommenda-
tions can also be construed as per the proposed idea58 
of  investors’ duties culture creation: investing compa-
nies must conspicuously frame their economic activi-
ties following domestic legislation; however, when the 
latter is still incipient in terms of  corporate social res-
ponsibility, it is expected that companies consider the 
recommendations set in the investment agreements 
so as to be more rigorous than the local laws. There is 
thus an additional effort expected from the investors. 
For instance, the Morocco-Nigeria bilateral investment 
agreement states that “[i]n addition to the obligation to com-
ply with all applicable laws and regulations of  the Host State 
55 Brazil-Anglo ACFI (01/04/2015), art. 10, annex II; Brazil-
Mozambique ACFI (30/03/2015), art.10, annex II; Brazil-Mexico 
ACFI (26/05/2015), art.13; Brazil-Malawi ACFI (25/06/2015), 
art.9; Brazil-Chile ACFI (24/11/2015), art.15. See also the economic 
and commercial agreement between Brazil and Peru (29/04/2016), 
art. 2.13.
56 On social acceptability, see: Corinne Gendron, “Penser 
l’acceptabilité sociale : au-delà de l’intérêt, les valeurs » (2014), Revue 
internationale Communication sociale et publique, vol.11, 2014, pp. 117–29.
57 Intra-Mercosur Investment Facilitation Protocol (07/04/2017), 
art. 13. [The Protocol has not yet been ratified].
58 See 1.1.1. supra.
and the obligations in this Agreement, and in accordance with 
the size, capacities and nature of  an investments, and taking 
into account the development plans and priorities of  the Host 
State and the Sustainable Development Goals of  the United 
Nations, investors and their investments should strive to make 
the maximum feasible contributions to the sustainable develop-
ment of  the Host State and local community through high levels 
of  socially responsible practices”59. The same treaty further 
highlights that the International Labour Organisation’s 
Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Investments 
and Social Policy must be applied and informs that the 
investors must always endeavour to maintain their cor-
porate social responsibility standards at the same level 
as those generally in force60. The agreement moreover 
makes provision for a prior social and environmental 
impact assessment61 whereby the investors must mea-
sure — and thus minimise — all negative social and 
environmental externalities potentially entrenched in 
the investments; concerning more specifically the envi-
ronmental impact assessment, it is mentioned that the 
companies must apply the rules thereto related of  either 
the host or the home State, whichever is the more pro-
tective. Direct obligations on corruption issues are also 
addressed to investors in the Morocco-Nigeria invest-
ment agreement62. The language of  this agreement is in-
teresting for being mandatory: article 18 is, for example, 
entitled “Post-Establishment Obligations” and article 
20, “Investor liability”. These are not mere recommen-
dations on corporate social responsibility but binding 
obligations. Article 18 states that the foreign investing 
companies must adopt an environmental management 
system — certified by or tantamount to the ISO 14001 
(on environmental management) when the activity is a 
high-risk one63. Investors must similarly make sure that 
their investments are respectful of  human rights and 
labour laws and standards64 and that a dialogical spirit 
exists between them and the local population65. When 
59 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.24 (1).
60 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.24 (2), (3).
61 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.14.
62 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.17.
63 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.18(1).
64 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.18 (2), (3), (4).
65 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.19 (1) (b).
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the standards for such a dialogue are inexistent or insu-
fficient, the Joint Committees instituted by the agree-
ment have the power to elaborate appropriate ones66. 
The introduction of  this article pointed out some cases 
in which capturing multinational companies’ liability 
for damages caused to the local population of  the host 
States was utterly difficult. Article 20 of  the Morocco-
-Nigeria investment agreement proposes an interesting 
tool to minimise the possibilities of  escaping from civil 
responsibility in such cases. It specifies that a company 
can be sued before and held liable by the tribunals of  its 
home State for a damage caused in the host State. This 
provision is a real innovation in the field of  international 
investment law and in that of  corporate social respon-
sibility. If  used, it might act as a bar to the oft-invoked 
forum non conveniens argument or that of  the corporate 
veil. In the same line of  innovations, the agreement also 
credits the host State with a right to information: it can, 
accordingly, ask potential investors (or their home Sta-
tes) relevant information on their practices of  healthy 
corporate governance67. In other words, investors re-
sultantly have here a duty of  information towards the 
State: if  solicited, they must inform the host State on 
the history of  their corporate social behaviour. Provi-
sions addressing direct recommendations or duties to 
investors also appear in the Iran-Slovakia investment 
agreement68, in the Argentina-Qatar agreement69, in the 
2015 Indian investment agreement model70 or in the 
new 2017 Colombian Investment Agreement model71.
66 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.19 (1) (c).
67 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nigeria 
(03/12/2016), art.21 (1).
68 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Iran and Slovakia 
(19/01/2016), art.10 (3)
69 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Argentina and Qatar 
(06/11/2016), art.12.
70 2015 Indian investment agreement model, art. 9 (contains ob-
ligations addressed to investors in matters of  corruption practices); 
art.12 (contains obligations addressed to investors to abide to lo-
cal laws relating, amongst others, to human rights, environment and 
labour protection; the same article also obliges investors to adopt 
national and international recognised standards of  corporate gov-
ernance).
71 The author had access to the 2017 Colombian investment 
model which has not yet been published. One article — with no 
number yet — states: “Claimant Investors shall respect the prohibitions 
established in international instruments, to which any Contracting Party is or 
becomes a party, pertaining to human rights and the environment. A Claimant 
Investor shall accept the aforementioned prohibitions as mandatory throughout 
the making of  its investment and its operation in the Host Party’s Territory in 
order to submit a claim to a Court or an Arbitral Tribunal pursuant to SEC-
TION [DD]- INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT.”
Even if  the incorporation of  investors’ duties in in-
vestment agreements could obviously be drafted in a 
more rigorous way, the abovementioned examples re-
main useful to establish, even exploratorily, the grounds 
of  a ‘normality’ of  juxtaposing in the same agreement 
provisions on investors’ protection and on their duties. 
The trend is, of  course, new but it constitutes a clear 
message sent to transnational companies: that their cor-
porate social conduct and eventually imposed obliga-
tions will potentially be considered so as to construe 
their due legal protection72. The duties are perhaps pre-
sented as voluntary ones, but the presence of  corporate 
social responsibility in the mentioned agreements is not 
innocent and is not deprived of  purpose. And it can be 
postulated that, if  consolidated and repeated in future 
investment agreements, it will, in the longer run, act as 
a condition as per which the protection due to investors 
could be measured; this, it is argued, could contribute to 
build a minimum standard of  corporate diligence.   
2.2. Investors’ Duties as a means to construe 
the extent of their legal protection: Postulating 
the construction of a minimum standard of 
corporate social diligence
As there once arose a debate on whether there exists 
a minimum standard of  treatment73, an analogy can be 
outlined on the existence of  an expected minimum level 
of  corporate social diligence on the part of  transnatio-
nal companies which are protected by a constellation 
of  investment agreements. And the question which can 
here be asked is whether a company which has been 
neglectful or which has not shown any diligence in ter-
ms of  an expected corporate social behaviour set in in-
vestment agreements can still use the latter as a legal 
shelter in case of  disputes with their host States. Accor-
dingly, the trend of  including investors’ commitments 
in investment agreements — or of  framing treaties or 
guiding principles on business and human rights —, 
is not deprived of  sense and purpose. It materialises a 
growing concern about corporate impunity and, in this 
sense, sketches a new, more nuanced, landscape of  in-
72 This shall be explored infra.
73 On the minimum standard of  treatment, see: OECD, “Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law”, 
OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/03, 
OECD Publishing, pp.8 et seq.; Rudolf  Dolzer and Christoph 
Schreuer, Principles of  International Investment Law, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp. 134 et seq.
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ternational investment law whereby the applicable law 
does not unconditionally focus on investors’ protection. 
The law thus strives to foresee investors and their activi-
ties and impacts in a broader social context. The inclu-
sion of  an expected corporate social responsibility of  
companies in investment agreements has arguably set 
the foundation and the first steps for the — surely slow 
— construction of  a doctrine of  a minimum standard 
of  corporate social diligence: under this assumption, in-
vestors will have to be minimally (socially) diligent to 
claim the application of  an investment agreement. If  
not, the provisions on the standards of  corporate social 
responsibility would be of  no use at all, they would be 
plainly ornamental and this, surely, is not the will of  
signatory States. Accordingly, the very legal purpose of  
these provisions can be examined. 
A minima, such purpose is twofold. There is firstly 
the will, on the part of  signatory States, that compa-
nies voluntarily incorporate such standards to articula-
te their activities with other values, may these be the 
respect of  the environment, of  human rights, of  local 
communities and culture, of  ethics and transparency. 
The first purpose is hence behavioural: companies are 
expected to adjust their corporate behaviour in a less 
egocentric fashion to mitigate the negative impacts of  
their activities. They are expected to be more diligent, 
more conscientious and to develop, over time, a culture 
of  corporate social responsibility. Secondly, the referen-
ce to investors’ duties and corporate social responsibi-
lity must not be excised from the other parts of  the 
agreements. It is here claimed that such reference can 
be invoked to construe the provisions on the standards 
of  treatment and of  protection of  investors. In other 
words, the legal protection due to foreign investors can 
be measured in the light of  their corporate social beha-
viour. This implies giving a purposeful effect, a raison 
d’être to the articles on investors’ duties. They are indeed 
inserted in a particular textual context and must, for this 
reason, be read in consonance with the standards of  in-
vestment protection. Besides investment protection and 
promotion, the preambles of  some of  the abovemen-
tioned agreements put corporate social responsibility 
as an objective and as means of  equilibrium between 
the distributions of  rights and duties of  the concerned 
stakeholders74. Resultantly, provisions on corporate so-
74 See for instance: Bilateral Investment Agreement between 
Morocco and Nigeria (03/12/2016); Intra-Mercosur Investment 
Facilitation Protocol (07/04/2017); Bilateral Investment Agreement 
cial responsibility can be used as a means of  contex-
tual interpretation of  substantial investment protection 
standards as per article 31 of  the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of  Treaties (1969). This would enable these 
provisions to deploy practical effects and thus, not be-
come a dead letter; there is, generally speaking, reasona-
ble jurisprudence on contextual interpretation in inter-
national law and this applies to international investment 
law75. 
As such, even if  some investors’ commitments are 
formulated as recommendations, it does not necessa-
rily mean that they are deprived of  legal effects. It is 
true that some of  the investment agreements state that 
the provisions on corporate social responsibility cannot 
be the object of  dispute resolution76. It can however 
be claimed that invoking corporate social responsibility 
clauses during an eventual dispute settlement procedure 
will not, in itself, be the object of  the dispute. The latter 
will still be related to a violation of  a substantial invest-
ment protection provision. In any case, the investor is in 
most cases — except in rare counterclaims — the clai-
mant and thus largely determines the object of  the dis-
pute which clearly focuses on violations of  substantial 
investment protection standards; the State does not and 
will not have a great leeway to permanently and solely 
move the spotlight on the question of  the company’s 
behaviour.  As stated, the relevant articles on corpo-
rate social responsibility will merely act as a means of  
interpretation and will not dominate the main debate. 
It would be a means to contextually enlighten and mea-
sure the extent of  investors’ effective protection by not 
overlooking the nature of  their corporate social beha-
viour. This would constitute an indirect manner to help 
build up a culture of  investors’ duties and awareness of  
the latter. And, from another perspective, the investors 
will also be able to invoke the corporate social respon-
between Iran and Slovakia (19/01/2016).
75 Competence of  the ILO to Regulate Incidentally the Personal Work of  
the Employer, PCIJ, Advisory Opinion, Series B, no.13 (23/07/1926), 
p. 19; Free Zones of  Upper Savoy and the District of  Gex, PCIJ, Series 
A, no.22, p. 13; Corfu Channel case, I.C.J. (09/04/1949), p. 24. See 
also: Japan – Taxation on alcoholic drinks, Report of  the WTO Ap-
pellate Body AB-1992-2, WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R & 
WT/DS11/AB/R [04/10/1996], p. 16; European Union – Custom 
Classification of  Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, Report of  the WTO Ap-
pellate Body  AB-2005-5, WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R 
[12/09/2005], p. 92, para. 214.
76 See for example: Intra-Mercosur Investment Facilitation Pro-
tocol (07/04/2017), art. 24 (3); the 2015 Indian investment agree-
ment model, art. 14.2.
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sibility clauses as an indicator of  their good faith. Such 
provisions will indeed be a measure of  the investors’ 
clean hands and act as a benchmark of  their legal pro-
tection. This assumption has already been echoed in the 
arbitral jurisprudence as debated in the next chapter.
3. Investors’ corporAte socIAl behAvIour As 
A benchmArk for theIr protectIon As per the 
ArbItrAl JurIsprudence
A mapping of  the investment arbitral jurisprudence 
shows that investors’ behaviour can be considered by 
arbitral tribunals to study the admissibility of  their de-
mand and the extent of  their legal protection. This has 
been done even without the existence of  specific pro-
visions on investors’ duties in investment agreements: 
some existing legal principles can be used to bring the 
issue of  investors’ duties in the debate. In that respect, 
investors’ clean hands, in terms of  corporate social 
behaviour, can act as a bar to their legal protection (3.1.) 
while their duty of  transparency to the host State can 
help decide if  they should be granted a legal protection 
(3.2.). If  the investors’ corporate social behaviour is 
ignored by arbitral tribunals, an unjust enrichment can 
then be arguably configured (3.3.).
3.1. Investors’ unclean hands as a bar to their 
legal protection
According to the clean hands doctrine, a party to a 
dispute cannot ask for an equitable reparation to the 
other if  it is itself  in violation of  a principle of  equity77. 
The doctrine’s existence has been recognised in inter-
national law78 even if  some doubts emerged as to its 
77  Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, 2009, p.286; Sir G. Fitzmau-
rice, “The General Principles of  International Law Considered from 
the Standpoint of  the Rule of  Law”, Recueil des Cours, vol.92, 1957, 
p. 119. See also: Diversion of  Water from the Meuse, P.C.I.J., Decision 
(28/06/1937), Individual Opinion of  Judge Hudson, p.77; Military 
and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of  America), C.I.J., Decision (27/07/1986), Dissenting Opinion 
of  Judge Schwebel, para. 269.
78 Report of  the International Law Commission, Document A/60/10, 
2005, p.108; Jean Salmon, “Des mains propres comme conditions de 
recevabilité des reclamations internationals”, Annuaire français de droit 
international, vol.10, 1964, p. 232; Richard Kreindler, “Corruption in 
International Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and the Unclean 
Hands Doctrine”, in, Kaj Hover, Annette Magnusson, Marie Ohr-
strom (org.), Between East and West : Essay in the Honour of  Elf  Franke, 
application in matters of  diplomatic protection79. Mo-
reover, one arbitral tribunal has already held that the 
clean hands doctrine is not a general principle of  law80. 
In the Nikos Resources v. Bangladesh case, the arbitral 
tribunal considered that three conditions had to be 
fulfilled to support a ‘clean hands’ claim: (i) the viola-
tion justifying the invocation of  the clean hands doc-
trine should still exist at the time of  the claim; (ii) the 
solution requested by the claimant must put an end to 
such violation; (iii) there must exist a reciprocity in the 
obligations which constitute the object of  the dispute81. 
These conditions are extracted from a Permanent Court 
of  Arbitration award82 and the latter is itself  inspired 
from an individual opinion of  Judge Hudson in the Di-
version of  Water from the Meuse case83. In both of  these ca-
ses, however, the legal dispute opposed two States. The 
third condition of  reciprocity was therefore relevant in 
these cases but cannot be purely transposed to the reality 
of  international investment law: a reciprocity of  rights 
and obligations might exist in a contract signed between 
investor and State but is traditionally inexistent when it 
comes to international investment agreements — sig-
ned between the home and the host State. In the Meuse 
case, for example, the Netherlands claimed that some 
Belgian constructions on the Meuse river were contra-
ry to a treaty signed between the two States; however, 
Netherlands’ clean hands gravitated into the debate be-
cause it had itself  undertaken other constructions along 
the same river. In this case, the claimant and the respon-
dent, both States, had reciprocal obligations. Therefore, 
Juris, 2010, pp. 317-318.
79 Report of  the International Law Commission, Document 
A/60/10, 2005, pp.108-112; Patrick Dumbery, Gabrielle Dumas-
Aubin, “How to Impose Human Rights Obligations on Corpora-
tions Under Investment Treaties?”, Yearbook of  International Invest-
ment Law and Policy, vol.4, 2012, pp. 589-591; Aleksandr Shapovalov, 
“Should a Requirement of  “Clean Hands” be a Prerequisite to the 
Exercise of  Diplomatic Protection? Human Rights Implications of  
the International Law Commission’s Debate”, American University In-
ternational Law Review, vol.20, 2005, pp. 829-866; Eric de Bradandere, 
“Human Rights Considerations in International Investment Arbitra-
tion”, in, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris, The Interpreta-
tion and Application of  the European Convention of  Human Rights: Legal 
and Practical Implications, Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff  Publish-
ers, 2012, pp. 183-215.
80 Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of  Man) v. The Russian Federation, UN-
CITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227, Award (18/07/2014), para. 1363.
81 Niko Resources v. Bangladesh, ICSID no. ARB/10/11, Decision 
on Jurisdiction (19/08/2013), para  481.
82 Guyana v. Suriname, PCA, Award (17/09/2007), paras.417-422.
83 Diversion of  Water from the Meuse, P.C.I.J., Decision (28/06/1937), 
Individual Opinion of  Judge Hudson, p. 77.
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the conditions retrieved from the Guyana v. Suriname or 
from the Meuse case do not constitute an appropriate 
analogy. The first condition — the continuous violation 
— is similarly debatable. Indeed, in international invest-
ment law, an investor can have a socially irresponsible 
behaviour while constituting and establishing its activi-
ties but not necessarily afterwards; this means that such 
a behaviour might not prevail at the time of  an arbitral 
procedure but it did exist upstream. 
This said, even if  a direct transposition of  the afore-
mentioned conditions in international investment law is 
not very convincing, it would be egregious to consider 
that a notorious social misconduct of  an investor in no 
way affects his capacity to benefit from the shield of  an 
investment agreement84. It will be argued hereinafter85 
that condoning such conducts might configure an un-
just enrichment. Examining the investors’ conduct prior 
to measure the extent of  their due protection is an issue 
which is not disregarded by arbitral tribunals. In other 
words, the clean hands doctrine or its inflections are 
used as a measure of  investors’ corporate social beha-
viour. The latter can prove relevant for an analysis of  
the investors’ claims at two levels, both of  which will be 
discussed infra: as a bar to jurisdiction and as bar to 
claims on the merits86.
In the Metal-Tech case, the investment had been 
made on the basis of  an original act of  corruption: the 
company bribed members of  the host State’s — Uz-
bekistan — government. The arbitral tribunal had to 
examine the legality of  a joint-venture liquidation under 
the Israel-Uzbekistan bilateral investment agreement. 
On the basis of  how the company constituted its in-
vestment, the arbitral tribunal stated that it lacked ju-
risdiction over the matter, the claims being “barred as a 
result of  corruption”87. The same tribunal further noted:
“The Tribunal found that the rights of  the investor against 
the host State, including the right of  access to arbitration, could 
not be protected because the investment was tainted by illegal ac-
84 In a similar sense, see: Inceysa Vallisoletaba v. El Salvador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/26, Award (02/08/2006), para. 248.
85 See section 2.3.
86 Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Ghana, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/24, Award (18/06/2010), para. 127; Zachary Douglas, 
“The Plea of  Illegality in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, ICSID Re-
view, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2014, pp.166-167; Jorge Viñuales, “Invest Dili-
gence in Investment Arbitration: Sources and Arguments”, ICSID 
Review, vol.32, nº.2 2017, p. 355 et eq.
87 Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Uzbekistan, ICSDI No. ARB/10/3, Award 
(04/10/2013), para. 389.
tivities, specifically corruption. The law is clear – and rightly so 
– that in such a situation the investor is deprived of  protection 
and, consequently, the host State avoids any potential liability”88.
Interestingly, the arbitral tribunal used the so-called 
“red flags” as indicators of  acts of  corruption89. “Red 
flags” are indicators of  practices of  corruption which 
are referred to in reports on business ethics. The Metal-
-Tech tribunal used the Woolf  report called Committee 
Report on Business Ethics, Global Companies and the Defence 
Industry: Ethical Business Conduct in Bae Systems Plc — The 
Way Forward90 to help characterise the corruption prac-
tice. Such practice was also contrary to the domestic 
laws of  Uzbekistan on bribery. Access to arbitration 
is, in this sense, not an open-door policy and the in-
vestor is accountable for its actions. In the Inceysa v. El 
Salvador case, a Spanish company had obtained a con-
cession contract for a service of  vehicle inspection by 
misrepresenting, amongst others, its financial status and 
its technical competences. A dispute between investor 
and State was brought before an ICSID tribunal. The 
latter acknowledged that any given investment had to 
be made in accordance with the prevailing local laws as 
well as with what it coined as international public poli-
cy. Consequently, in the tribunals words, if  it declared 
“itself  competent to hear the disputes between the parties, it would 
completely ignore the fact that, above any claim of  an investor, 
there is a meta-positive provision that prohibits attributing effects 
to an act done illegally”91. In the direct line of  what the 
clean hands doctrine commands, the tribunal pointed 
out that “[n]o legal system based on rational grounds allows the 
party that committed a chain of  clearly illegal acts to benefit from 
them”92. In light of  this principle, the tribunal declined 
its jurisdiction: the investor’s claim was barred93. 
As per a similar logic, in other cases where the deba-
88 Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Uzbekistan, ICSDI No. ARB/10/3, Award 
(04/10/2013), para. 422.
89 Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Uzbekistan, ICSDI No. ARB/10/3, Award 
(04/10/2013), para. 293.
90 Woolf  Committee, Committee Report on Business Ethics, Global 
Companies and the Defence Industry: Ethical Business Conduct in Bae Sys-
tems Plc — The Way Forward, May 2008, p.26 [available at: https://
www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/technical/ethics/woolf-
report-2008.ashx].
91 Inceysa Vallisoletaba v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 
Award (02/08/2006), para. 248.
92 Inceysa Vallisoletaba v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 
Award (02/08/2006), para. 244.
93 Inceysa Vallisoletaba v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 
Award (02/08/2006), para. 339. In a similar sense, see: Europe Ce-
ment Investment and Trade S.A. v. Republic of  Turkey, ICSID Case Nº. 
ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (13/08/2009).
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te was on the merits and no longer on jurisdiction, the 
investors were not granted legal protection when there 
was enough evidence of  corporate social misbehaviour. 
In the World Duty Free v. Kenya case, a British company 
was charged of  building and operating duty-free shops 
of  the airports of  Nairobi and Mombasa. However, the 
contract with the host State was made possible only in 
counterpart of  a bribe of  two million dollars paid to the 
Kenyan President. Hence, the company’s activity star-
ted with an act of  corruption. The latter had infringed 
Kenyan law and characterised a socially irresponsible 
conduct. The case was brought to arbitration on a claim 
of  expropriation made by the investor. The arbitral tri-
bunal stated that an illegal conduct of  a company bar-
red the latter in lodging a claim against an illegal action 
of  the other contracting party94. The tribunal referred 
to the ex turpi causa non oritur actio principle95, that is, 
‘from a dishonourable cause an action will not arise’. 
Admitting the claimants request would be contrary to 
what the tribunal coined as transnational public policy96. 
Analysing an investor’s fraudulent conduct in the Plama 
case, the arbitral tribunal highlighted:
“The Tribunal is of  the view that granting the ECT’s97 pro-
tections to Claimants investments would be contrary to the princi-
ple nemo auditor propriam allegans […]. It would also be 
contrary to the basic notion of  international public policy — that 
a contract obtained by wrongful means (fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion) should not be enforced by a tribunal.98”
That a fraudulent99 activity or investment cannot 
be protected by an investment agreement is a general 
principle that has built into international investment law 
and arbitration100; investors have the duty to be aware 
94 World Duty Free v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award 
(04/10/2006), para. 179.
95 World Duty Free v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award 
(04/10/2006), para. 179.
96 World Duty Free v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award 
(04/10/2006), para. 157. See also: R. Zachary Torres-Fowler, “Un-
dermining ICSDI: How the Global Antibribery Regime Impairs In-
vestor-State Arbitration”, Virginia Journal of  International Law, vol.52, 
no.4, 2012, p. 988.
97 Energy Charter Treaty.
98 Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case Nº. ARB/03/24, 
Award (27/08/2008), para. 143.
99 The fraud must conspicuously be duly evidenced. See: The Rom-
petrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award 
(06/05/2013), paras. 182. 
100 David Minnotte and Robert Lewis v. Poland, ICSID Case Nº. 
ARB(AF)/10/1, Award (16/05/2014), para. 131; Abaclat and others 
v. Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case Nº. ARB/07/5, Decision on Juris-
diction and Admissibility (04/08/2011), para. 648.
of  this principle101. Consequently, even a proven viola-
tion of  an investment agreement by State might bar an 
investor’s claim in case of  corporate social misconduct. 
For instance, in the Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq case, 
the arbitral tribunal found that the Host State, Indone-
sia, had infringed the Agreement on Promotion, Pro-
tection and Guarantee of  Investments among Member 
States of  the Organisation of  the Islamic Conference’s 
provision on fair and equitable treatment. However, this 
was matched with the Saudi investor’s acts related to 
corruption and money laundering in the banking sec-
tor. The tribunal perpended the company’s behaviour 
and concluded that the clean hands doctrine applied to 
the case. The doctrine was used to uphold the content 
of  article 9 of  the agreement which provides that the 
investors must “refrain from all acts that may disturb public 
order or morals or that may be prejudicial to the public interest” 
and that “[h]e is also to refrain from exercising restrictive practi-
ces and from trying to achieve gains through unlawful means”102. 
Resultantly, despite the agreement’s violation by Indo-
nesia, the investor’s claim was barred103.
The distribution of  rights and duties between inves-
tors and States does not abide to a Manichean logic; the 
Host States are not completely exonerated of  their res-
ponsibility because of  the corporate social misconduct 
of  investors. In matters of  corruption, for example, the 
illegal act is necessarily materialised by the participa-
tion of  a State’s representative. The latter — President, 
members of  the Government — was clearly identified 
in the abovementioned cases; thus, a claim’s dismissal 
by an arbitral tribunal often implies that there has been 
a reprehensible conduct of  both parties, investor and 
State.  If  so, one tribunal has already decided that the 
Parties should share the costs of  the arbitral procedu-
re104. If  not, that is in the absence of  State collusion, 
another tribunal considered that the costs had to be su-
pported by the sole investor105.
The applicability of  the clean hands hypothesis is, 
101 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Philippines, 
ICSID Case Nº. ARB/03/25, Award (16/08/2007), para. 402.
102 Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of  In-
vestments among Member States of  the Organisation of  the Islamic 
Conference (05/06/1981), art.9.
103 Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Award 
(15/12/2014), paras. 647-648. For a critical analysis of  this case, see 
Hervé Ascensio’s article in this same issue.
104 Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Uzbekistan, ICSDI Nº. ARB/10/3, Award 
(04/10/2013), paras. 422-423.
105 Inceysa Vallisoletaba v. El Salvador, ICSID Case Nº. ARB/03/26, 
Award (02/08/2006), para. 338.
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as such, at least tested in the arbitral jurisprudence. It is 
possible to postulate a legal articulation between inves-
tors’ duties and the clean hands doctrine in the sense 
that corporate misconduct implies unclean hands and 
the latter acts as a bar to investors’ protection. If  com-
panies have a legitimate expectation that the State will 
act coherently, consistently and in full transparency106, 
it can conversely be legitimately expected that investors 
demonstrate practices of  corporate social responsibili-
ty or the inexistence of  corporate social misconduct in 
order to plead the applicability of  a given investment 
agreement.
Besides the clean hands doctrine, the arbitral ju-
risprudence also reveals that investors have a duty of  
transparency vis-à-vis their host States: infringing this 
duty might boil down to a fraudulent manoeuvre.
3.2. Investors’ duty of transparency as a 
measure of their legal protection
Before establishing their activities, investors nor-
mally have to provide basic information to the host 
State, namely on their financial situation or on their te-
chnical capacities. In this sense, there is an expectation 
that they act transparently towards the State. Some new 
agreements provide that the investors have a duty to 
inform the host State about their corporate governance 
history and agenda107. Nevertheless, some investments 
have sometimes been successfully established on the 
basis of  erroneous information communicated to the 
host State. This is even more abusive when done in the 
context of  developing States which do not always have 
all the technical means to double-check the communi-
cated information108, without mentioning that the com-
106 See generally: Michele Potestà, “Legitimate Expectations in 
Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of  
a Controversial Concept”, ICSID Review, vol. 28, 2014, pp. 88-122; 
Rudolf  Dolzer, “Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contour”, 
Santa Clara Journal of  International Law, vol.12, 2014, p. 7-33; Eliza-
beth Snodgrass, “Protecting Investors’ Legitimate Expectations: 
Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle”, ICSID Review, 
vol.21, 2006, pp. 1-58; Nitish Monebhurrun, “Gold Reserve Inc. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela - Enshrining Legitimate Expecta-
tions as a General Principle of  International Law?”, Journal of  Inter-
national Arbitration vol.32, nº. 5, 2015, pp. 551-562.
107 Bilateral Investment Agreement between Morocco and Nige-
ria (03/12/2016), art.21 (1).
108 Peter Muchlinski, “Caveat Investor? The Relevance of  the 
Conduct of  the Investor under the Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.55, 2006, 
p. 538.
panies’ good faith is, in any case, presumed.
In the Azinian v. Mexico case, the arbitral tribunal no-
ted that the investment had been made possible only 
because the (American) investor had voluntarily exa-
ggerated its intrinsic technical experience and financial 
means in the waste management sector109; there was 
a will to impress but at the same time to mislead the 
State through false representations and unfeasible pro-
mises110. The investor invoked a curious argument as a 
means of  defence: it argued that the host State should 
not have believed its overtly optimistic and unreasona-
ble promises; the argument did not convince the tribu-
nal111. A similar situation arose in the already mentioned 
Inceysa case: the investment was accepted by the host 
State, El Salvador, after having received fraudulent in-
formation from the investor, erroneous information on 
financial and budgetary matters, on the competence of  
employees, dissimulation of  technical competences and 
of  the content of  its real experience in the field of  vehi-
cle inspection112. The arbitral tribunal found that such 
dissimulation and that the deceptive information cons-
tituted a forgery which removed the applicable invest-
ment agreement’s protective umbrella from above the 
investor. True, the host State must not passively believe 
all the fabulous promises made by the investor and must 
deploy all reasonable means to ascertain the represen-
tations’ veracity; however, the State’s diligence may vary 
as per their available resources, which in turn depends 
on their level of  development. 
These cases can inductively trace the contours of  
a duty of  transparency, the latter acting as a means to 
construe investment agreements so as to assess the ou-
treach of  the standards of  treatment and protection. 
The investors’ duty of  transparency covers a wider 
spectrum of  concern as it has an indirect impact on the 
host State’s population. The investor is paid by the State 
as there is an expectation that the financed activity be 
beneficial to its society and population. There is there-
fore an opportunity cost embedded in such investment 
as the value paid to the investor excludes other potential 
investments which could have been made to benefit the 
109 Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian and Ellen Bacca v. Mexico, IC-
SID Case Nº. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award (01/11/1999), paras. 29-33.
110 Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian and Ellen Bacca v. Mexico, IC-
SID Case Nº. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award (01/11/1999), para. 107.
111 Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian and Ellen Bacca v. Mexico, IC-
SID Case Nº. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award (01/11/1999), para. 108.
112 Inceysa Vallisoletaba v. El Salvador, ICSID Case Nº. ARB/03/26, 
Award (02/08/2006), para. 236.
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same population. When an investment is fraudulently 
constituted through misrepresentations of  the investor, 
the opportunity cost is materialised given that there is 
an inefficient allocation of  resources to the detriment 
of  the local population. For this reason, the duty of  
information goes beyond the small sphere of  the arbi-
tral procedure and relate, more widely to the investor’s 
corporate social responsibility.
If  this duty of  transparency is not legally considered 
and if, similarly, the investors’ unclean hands are igno-
red, they would, in other words, be deriving a benefit 
— its investment and profits — from fraudulent acts 
or from practices of  corruption. Said sardonically, their 
corporate social misconduct would in a certain way be 
rewarded. To ignore investors’ duties would be tanta-
mount to an unjust enrichment113.
3.3. The Constitution of an Unjust Enrichment in 
case of the non-recognition of investors’ duties
Unjust enrichment has been considered as a general 
principle of  law114. An undue enrichment to the detri-
113 American Manufacturing and Trading v. Zaire, ICSID Case Nº. 
ARB/93/1, Award (21/02/1997), para. 7.15.
114 Benjamin R. Isaiah v. Bank Mella, Iran-USA Claims Tribunal, 
Case Nº. 219, Award Nº. 35-219-2 (30/03/1983), Iran-USA Claims 
Tribunal Reports, vol.2, p. 236; Sea-Land Services Inc. v. Iran, Iran-USA 
Claims Tribunal, Case no.33, Award nº. 135-33-1 (20/06/1984), 
Iran-USA Claims Tribunal Reports, vol.6, 1984, p. 169; Saluka Invest-
ments v. Czech Republic, UNICITRAL, Partial Award (17/03/2006), 
para. 449; Inceysa Vallisoletaba v. El Salvador, ICSID Case Nº. 
ARB/03/26, Award (02/08/2006), para. 254; Ambatielos Case (Greece 
v. United Kingdom and Northern Ireland), Dissenting Opinion of  Profes-
sor Spiropoulos (06/03/1956), Recueil des sentences arbitrales des Nations 
Unies, vol. XII, p. 129. See also: Lena Goldfields Ltd. v. USSR, Award 
(03/09/1930), para. 25.
For the legal literature, see: Kit Barker, « Understanding the Unjust 
Enrichment Principle in Private Law  : A Study of  the Concept and 
its Reasons », in, J.W. Neyers, M. Mcinnes, S.G.A. Pittel [org.], Under-
standing Unjust Enrichment, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 82; De-
tlev C. Dicke, “Unjust enrichment and compensation”, in, Detlev C. 
Dicke [dir.], Foreign Investment in the Present and a New International Eco-
nomic Order, Fribourg, University Press Fribourg Switzerland, 1987, 
p. 269; Brice Dickson, « Unjust Enrichment Claims : A Comparative 
Overview », Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 54, no.1, 1995, pp. 100-126; 
Christoph Schreuer, Christina Binder, « Unjust Enrichment », The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public International Law, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007, para. 10, online edition [available at : www.mpepil.
com]; Lord Mcnair, « The General Principles of  Law Recognised 
by Civilised Nations », British Yearbook of  International Law, vol.33, 
1957, p. 11; Ana Vohryzek, « Unjust Enrichment Unjustly Ignored: 
Opportunities and Pitfalls in Bringing Unjust Enrichment Claims 
under ICSID », Loyola of  Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review, vol.3, 2009, p. 503.
ment of  a party must be restored from the perspective 
of  commutative justice115. The Iran-USA Claims tribu-
nal enlightened the principle’s content and its case law 
often inspires modern arbitral tribunals116. In the Sea-
-land Services v. Iran case, unjust enrichment was defined 
as such:
“There must have been an enrichment of  one party to the 
detriment of  the other, and both must arise as a consequence of  
the same act or event. There must be no justification for the en-
richment, and no contractual or other remedy available to the in-
jured party whereby he might seek compensation from the party 
enriched117”.
Five conditions must be fulfilled: 1) the enrichment 
of  one party; 2) the impoverishment of  the other party; 
3) a causal relationship between the enrichment and the 
impoverishment; 4) an unjustified enrichment; 5) the 
absence of  a means of  redress for the impoverished 
party118.
The enrichment could be realised in two ways. Firs-
tly, the profits made by a company having won a bid or 
a contract through fraud or acts of  corruption could 
be tantamount to an unjust enrichment; these profits 
would never have never been made without the origi-
nal illegality. Secondly, reparations ordered by a tribunal 
and paid by a State to a company having had a corporate 
social misconduct during its investment could also be 
equivalent to an unjust enrichment. In a Repsol v. Ecuador 
case, the defendant State argued before an Annulment 
Committee that it had a moral duty to annul an award 
rendered by an arbitral tribunal so as not to unjustly 
enrich the foreign company119. The principle of  unjust 
enrichment appears as an objective means of  balance 
115 Kit Barker, « Understanding the Unjust Enrichment Princi-
ple in Private Law  : A Study of  the Concept and its Reasons », 
in, J.W. Neyers, M. Mcinnes, S.G.A. Pittel [org.], Understanding Unjust 
Enrichment, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 97; Daniel Patrick 
O’Connell, “Unjust Enrichment”, The American Journal of  Compara-
tive Law, vol.V, 1956, p. 4.
116 Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, UNICITRAL, Partial 
Award (17/03/2006), para. 449; Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case Nº. 
ARB/01/12, Award (14/07/2006), para.437.
117 Sea-Land Services Inc. v. Iran, Iran-USA Claims Tribunal, Case 
nº.33, Award nº. 135-33-1 (20/06/1984), Iran-USA Claims Tribunal 
Reports, vol.6, 1984, p. 169.
118 Christoph Schreuer, Christina Binder, « Unjust Enrichment », 
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public International Law, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007, paras. 1-2, online edition [available at : www.
mpepil.com]
119 Repsol YPF Ecuador S.A. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/10, Decision on Annulment (28/01/2007) para. 25.
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between the distribution of  rights and duties of  inves-
tors and States120: it helps grasp the big picture of  their 
relationship.
The unjust enrichment argument was accepted by 
the arbitral tribunal in Inceysa. It is worth recalling that 
the investor’s establishment in El Salvador had been 
successful only because of  various misinformation and 
misrepresentations. The arbitral tribunal decided that 
the activity, by way of  its constitution, was not an in-
vestment and refused to hear the claims on the merits. 
Accepting the investor’s request would, for the tribunal, 
imply creating favourable conditions for an unjust en-
richment: 
“Applying the principle [of  unjust enrichment] to the case 
at hand, we note that Inceysa resorted to fraud to obtain a benefit 
that it would not have otherwise obtained. Thus, through actions 
that violate the legal principles [of  unjust enrichment], Incey-
sa tried to enrich itself, signing an administrative contract with 
MARN, which, without any doubt, would produce considerable 
profit for it. (…). The clear evidence that proves the violations lis-
ted in chapter IV of  this award leads this Tribunal to decide that 
an interpretation that would grant BIT protection to Inceysa’s 
illegal investment would favor its unlawful enrichment, which no 
tribunal constituted according to the Agreement can do.121”
Tentatively, the five conditions mentioned above 
find application here. The enrichment is related to the 
profits derived from an illegally constituted activity. 
This enrichment is due to payments made by the State 
and by its population; the latter is consequently impove-
rished. The causal relationship is crystalized given that 
the enrichment of  one party results from the impove-
rishment of  the other (the State and one of  the compo-
nent of  the State, its population). The enrichment is un-
just because of  the illegality and corporate misconduct 
characterising the investor’s activity. The impoverished 
State does not really have a means of  redress against the 
investor in international law.
Just like the company’s clean hands or duty of  trans-
parency, the principle of  unjust enrichment appears as 
another legal strategy to block investor’s abusive claims. 
Most importantly, the combination of  these duties is 
useful to raise investors’ awareness about the legal con-
sequences of  corporate social misconduct, that is, to in-
120 ENRON Corp. Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3, Award (22/07/2007), para. 214.
121 Inceysa Vallisoletaba v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, 
Award (02/08/2006), paras. 255-256.
form that their legal protection under investment agree-
ments depends on their corporate social responsibility.
4. concludIng remArks
This article had for main aim tracing, while catego-
rising, a trend of  investors’ duties in international in-
vestment law. If  the legal landscape is still patchy on 
this question, perusing the spheres of  investment agree-
ments and of  the arbitral jurisprudence has shown per-
meability for corporate social responsibility in a manner 
that is conducive to its articulation with the traditional 
standards of  treatment and protection of  investments. 
This articulation revealed that investors’ duties are gra-
dually acquiring a legal purpose, if  not a consensual ac-
ceptance. The inclusion of  these duties in this law field 
plays a double role: that of  an adjuvant to champion the 
creation of  a corporate social responsibility culture and 
that of  an interpretative instrument used to objectively 
assess the extent of  investors’ protection under invest-
ment agreements.
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